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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The currently fashionable theory of self-organisation has its origins in statistical physics. 
Many believe that the underlying physics model, which is based on inanimate systems, 
can be employed to explain and predict the emergence of social structures, even of 
history itself. Some are even convinced that it will be possible to construct a social 
physics to displace the social sciences. The purpose of this article is to test those claims 
by reviewing some of the physical studies that have been made of human society, and its 
conclusion is that those claims cannot be substantiated. The underlying problem is that 
self-organisation is a one-dimensional theoretical concept that focuses exclusively upon 
supply-side interactions, from which order and complexity are said to ‘emerge’. But there 
is a better way. By systematic observation of living systems, both human and non-human, 
it has been possible to derive a general dynamic theory that embraces a more complex 
reality, involving a creative exchange between decision-making individuals and the 
changing needs of their society. I have called this interaction between the dynamic forces 
of demand and supply in living systems, the process of ‘strategic exchange’. And it is this 
strategic exchange that determines all other structural relationships in society, including 
the interaction between its constituent members. It is important in the social sciences, 
therefore, to move on from social physics to realist dynamics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Owing to the failure of orthodox social science disciplines to develop a realist general 
dynamic theory, raiders from the natural sciences have appeared regularly at our 
borders. In the mid 1970s, Darwinian biologists threatened to absorb the social 
sciences into something Edward Wilson (1975) called ‘sociobiology’. This much-
celebrated intellectual global empire, however, has failed to eventuate (Snooks 2003: 
chs 7 & 8). More recently – since the 1990s – the champions of statistical physics 
have claimed success where their biology competitors failed.  
 The purpose of this article is to test the strength of the claims for an all-
conquering social physics. The results suggest that social physics, despite a build up 
of forces over the past few decades, has been no more successful in its objective of 
global mastery than sociobiology. Even their hybrid progeny – game theory and 
agent-based computational modelling (ABM) – resulting from opportunistic raids into 
new territory, have proved to be little more than shield-beating exercises. What social 
sciences actually requires is a transformation from within rather than a take-over from 
without. As social scientists are best placed to understand the nature of society, it is 
they, rather than intellectual warriors from the natural sciences, who should be 
developing our understanding of social dynamics. It is in this spirit that I propose the 
dynamic theory of ‘selfcreation’, which is a bulwark against the invading theory of 
self-organisation. 
 
 
SELFCREATION – A REALIST THEORY OF LIFE 
  
The essence of the theory of selfcreation is to be found in the creative exchange 
between purposeful agents and their society’s unfolding dynamic strategy. It is this 
‘strategic exchange’ that lies at the very heart of the self-sustaining dynamics of living 
systems. Social agents are self-motivated and self-driven, and they generate 
complexity and order in a creative response to a continuously changing strategic 
demand. It is this creative exchange between the demand and supply sides of a 
dynamic living system that generates changing genetic structures, technologies, ideas 
of all types, institutions, and organizations. By attempting to meet this constantly 
changing strategic demand, both the agents and their society are transformed in the 
long run. The creative process of exchange by which this takes place constitutes the 
‘life system’ for the group of social agents in whom we are interested. Living systems, 
therefore, are ‘autogenous’ – or selfcreative – systems. 
 The dynamic theory behind the concept of selfcreation – the ‘dynamic-strategy 
theory’ – should be familiar enough by now. It has been published and formally 
commented upon in this journal on several occasions (Snooks 2002; 2005b; 
Nazaretyan 2005; Magee 2006) and in a series of books over the past decade (Snooks 
1996; 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 1999; 2000; 2003). Accordingly, the dynamic-strategy 
theory requires no further elaboration here. The concept of ‘selfcreation’, as an 
autogenous dynamic process, has also been developed in my most recent book 
entitled The Selfcreating Mind (2006). As argued there, the ‘selfcreating mind’ is ‘the 
mind that created itself’ through the response of countless organisms to the ever-
changing demands of their dynamic societies. They are driven to do so by the need to 
survive and prosper – a materialist force I call ‘strategic desire’ – but they are directed 
to do so by the requirements of a dynamic life system – a force I call ‘strategic 
demand’. The concept of the ‘selfcreating mind’ – which displaces the mind 
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hypothesised by psychoanalytic, Darwinian, and complexity theorists – provides a 
new perspective on the origin, nature, and purpose of the self-conscious mind; the 
reasons for its continuing breakdown in a significant minority of the population; and 
the surest road to recovery. It also provides answers to questions about the future of 
brain genetics, artificial intelligence, and the possibility of eliminating mental 
disorders. What I have not addressed in published form so far, however, is how the 
theory of selfcreation contrasts with that of self-organisation. This is the subject of the 
present article. 
Selfcreation is an entirely new concept. In the selfcreation model, strategic 
exchange determines all other relationships in society, including the interaction 
between its constituent members. Strategic exchange is the core dynamic process, 
whereas agent interaction is a derived and, hence, secondary process. What this 
implies is that cooperation is central to the pursuit of survival and prosperity, while 
competition between agents is an attempt at the margin to improve individual strategic 
advantage. And cooperation is the outcome not of reiterative interactions between 
agents as claimed by game theorists but of the need to ensure the success of their joint 
strategic pursuit. The point here, of course, is that a society’s strategic success is 
immeasurably more important to every individual than marginal changes in the 
individual pecking order. This key issue is completely lost on the theorists of self-
organisation.  
Self-organisation is a concept that has arisen from the use of statistical physics 
to explain the emergence of complexity and order in living systems. The history of 
this concept has taken two paths. First, some physicists have attempted to develop a 
physics of society – literally to explain the complexity of living systems in terms of 
the laws of physics. These are the hard-line intellectual warriors, who prefer to see 
people as particles. Second, there are others, mainly computer-oriented economists 
and political scientists, who are attempting to combine the structure of the physics 
model with the decision-making characteristics of living agents. While abandoning 
the laws of physics, they heroically assume that complexity is the outcome of supply-
side interactions between agents subject to bounded rationality. It is argued here that 
self-organisation is a misnomer, because, as a theoretical construct, it does not 
embody a self-organising mechanism. Rather, it relies either on an exogenous driving 
force (physics model) or an exogenous rule-setter (agent-based model). Only the 
process of selfcreation transcends these limitations. Even more significantly, the 
concept of self-organisation is unable to account for the dynamics of life or human 
society. A physics of society, therefore, is totally out of the question. These issues will 
be explored further in the remainder of the article. 
 
 
 SELF-ORGANISATION – A THEORY OF INANIMATE INTERACTION 
 
The currently popular theory of self-organisation has its origins, as already suggested, 
in statistical physics. As one populariser of this approach has said: 
Scientists are beginning to realize [assert?] that the theoretical framework that 
underpins contemporary physics can be adapted to describe social structures 
and behaviour, ranging from how traffic flows to how the economy fluctuates 
and how businesses are organized. (Ball 2004: 13) 
Less cautious authors are even convinced that the models of statistical physics can be 
employed to explain the origin of life (Kauffman 1993; 1995), the extinction of 
species (Bak 1997), and the transformations of human history (Buchanan 2000). 
 3
 The basic idea behind the physics model of living systems is that their 
observed order and complexity is an outcome of interactions between large numbers 
of agents. These interactions are said to obey a few simple rules. It is an idea that 
arises from an analogy with the order that emerges spontaneously in inanimate 
systems owing to the laws of motion, gravity, and friction. In an open physical 
system, the interactions between its inanimate members are generated by the 
imposition of an external source of energy. Although it is not possible to calculate 
with any degree of precision the pattern of numerous colliding objects, the outcome is 
known to be ordered and complex. 
 The so-called sand-pile model, developed by Per Bak (1997), is a favourite 
analogy with those attempting to persuade us of the relevance of self-organisation 
theory to human society. The issue usually emphasised in discussions of the sand-pile 
model is the contrasting states of a sand-pile in equilibrium on a tabletop, and the 
same sand-pile augmented by a flow of sand grains from above. We are told that as 
additional grains of sand fall on the pile, it will build up until its slope reaches a 
critical level in relation to the force of gravity. From then on, the addition of further 
grains will cause either one large landslide or a series of smaller landslides, which 
cannot be determined in advance. Hence, our complex sand structure suddenly 
collapses and forms a featureless mass on the tabletop. This is known as a ‘phase 
transition’. By resuming the steady flow of sand from above, the process of 
construction and collapse will be repeated until sand covers the entire tabletop and 
begins flowing over the edge each time a landslide occurs. 
 From this point in the sand-pile’s history, the quantity of sand on the tabletop 
stays (on average) the same, and the quantity flowing over the edge is equal to that 
being added from above. We are told that the sand-pile ‘system’ is now in a state of 
‘self-organised criticality’ (SOC), created by a constant flow of energy from outside 
the system. The significant characteristic about a system in this critical state is that the 
addition of just a single grain of sand will cause the pile to generate either a single 
large avalanche or a series of smaller avalanches. While this constitutes a stationary 
state – as the system never departs far from it – it is not an equilibrium state because 
of the flow of energy (new grains of sand) from outside. It is a far-from-equilibrium 
state. Large claims have been made for the SOC concept first proposed by Bak and 
his colleagues (1989), but it also has its critics (Newman 1996; Sneppen and Newman 
1996). 
 The sand-pile model has been analysed, using computer technology, from the 
micro as well as the macro level. But there is a problem. Grains of sand in real sand-
piles do not behave in quite the way that computer sand-piles do. Grains of sand are 
not sufficiently ‘sticky’ to generate the above-mentioned series of well-defined 
smaller avalanches. It transpires that the ‘best’ sand-pile is one consisting of long-
grained rice! Anyway, this ‘ideal’ computer sand-pile (or ‘rice-pile’) can be employed 
to view the interactions between individual grains by providing them with different 
colours. 
This technique shows an ‘active’ interaction between all grains in the pile. New grains 
falling from above do not just slide down the outside, they are driven deeply into the 
pile and after a time emerge again before being caught up in an avalanche. Some 
grains stay in the pile considerably longer than others. But, while no grain stays in the 
pile for the entire computer experiment, any grain can stay there for any length of 
time. In other words, all grains are involved in the process of interaction, build-up, 
and collapse.  
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Here in the sand-pile model are all the main features of the theory of self-
organisation. The application of an external energy source to an open system 
consisting of a large number of particles, causes those particles to interact 
energetically so as to create complex structures that build-up to a critical point and 
then collapse in unpredictable ways. It is a cycle that recurs for as long as the 
exogenous driving force, and the resulting state of SOC, continue to exist. This 
process of self-organisation, therefore, is the outcome of a physical system obeying 
simple laws of physics, including those of motion, gravity, and friction. 
 Both macro and micro outcomes in this model are unpredictable owing to the 
large number of interacting objects. Newtonian precision is only possible when the 
interaction takes place between two or three objects. How then is it possible for order 
to exist in the real world? Unpredictable outcomes are said to obey a ‘power law’ – 
the law of large numbers – which govern the probability of fluctuations of a given 
size. This law tells us that while avalanches of any size can be generated at any time 
by small triggers in a sand-pile experiencing self-organised criticality, the probability 
of large events is considerably less than that of small events. Figure 1, which is a 
schematic double-log graph, shows that the approximate probability of large 
avalanches (on the right of the diagram) are less frequent than small avalanches (on 
the left). A power law is represented by a straight line on a double-log diagram. In this 
type of model, the exponent of the power law (the slope of the line) is close to –1 
(Newman 2005). 
 A distribution obeying a power law is a modified random walk – a random 
walk punctuated with steps of any size, where the probability of occurrence decreases 
as the steps get bigger. In other words, it can be thought of as a gaussian probability 
curve with ‘fat’ tails. In a normal random walk, all steps are the same size. What, you 
might ask, does this actually mean? Even a physicist would have to admit that this 
discussion is merely descriptive. Nevertheless, a number of ‘physical mechanisms’ 
have been suggested by physicists to explain power laws. The chief among them are 
the so-called ‘Yule process’ (‘the rich get richer’) in which, for example, the largest 
cities acquire more inhabitants than smaller cities in proportion to existing population 
sizes; and the concept of self-organised criticality that has already been discussed. 
These explanations, however, are unsatisfactory because they are ad hoc, partial, and 
not part of a general dynamic theory. For example, in the case of city growth these 
mechanisms do not explain the underlying reasons for city growth or why some 
initially grew faster than others. They only ‘explain’ the distribution of subsequent 
growth once the all-important general pattern has been laid down. Even then, the 
explanations are statistical rather than ‘strategic’ (or existential), as they are not part 
of a more general dynamic theory of complex systems. 
 More importantly, it is clear that the interaction between particles being 
described in this model is the result not of ‘choice’ but of the flow of outside energy. 
It has already been mentioned that ‘self-organisation’ is a misnomer, as interactions 
between particles are generated by exogenous forces. ‘Forced-organisation’ would be 
a better name. None of this matters, of course, provided everyone is clear about what 
the term ‘self-organisation’ actually means in this context, and provided the 
distinction between self-less ‘self-organisation’ on the one hand and self-full 
‘selfcreation’ on the other is recognised. What does matter, however, is that self-
organisation is a concept that applies persuasively only to inanimate systems, and 
only then as an outcome of an exogenous driving force. 
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What the sand-pile model cannot tell us is how complex inanimate systems change 
over time. What pathways do complex systems take? What is their history? Classical 
thermodynamics is unable to analyse these issues because its method is limited to 
comparative statics rather than dynamics. It is, in other words, interested in the 
equilibrium conditions that exist both before and after a ‘phase transition’ occurs. 
Traditionally, classical thermodynamics has focused on systems that change suddenly 
from one state to another, such as the transition from a liquid to a gas or a liquid to a 
frozen solid; or on increasing entropy in closed systems leading from order to 
disorder. It is interesting that neoclassical economics, which was strongly influenced 
by classical thermodynamics with its focus on equilibrium and comparative statics, 
also failed to develop a theory of dynamics (Snooks 1993; 1998b). 
 In contrast, complexity theory, which is an outcome of the more recent 
statistical physics, is concerned with non-equilibrium processes of change. It is, in 
other words, concerned to focus on the history of inanimate and, more recently, living 
systems. There has been a belated recognition by physicists that real-world processes 
of change rarely take the form of great leaps between equilibrium states. With this 
change of focus, the challenge became how to analyse the growth path of systems 
employing a supply-side model of forced physical interaction. The solution, pioneered 
by Ilya Prigogine (1981) and others from the 1950s and 1960s, was to view the 
growth process as the outcome of a succession of bifurcations or crisis points offering 
two very different paths forward. What links phase transitions with non-equilibrium 
bifurcations, of course, is the underlying model of ‘forced interactions’. 
 Equilibrium is not an option for a system being driven by a persistent 
exogenous force. Once a crisis point has been reached – see Figure 2 – the dynamic 
system is forced to change its state abruptly and dramatically by ‘choosing’ one of the 
alternative paths available to it. In an inanimate system this ‘choice’, we are told, is 
determined by the smallest chance or random fluctuation. The outcome, therefore, is 
entirely arbitrary, being determined by the contingencies of history. Hence, two 
systems with identical starting points and the same driving force, can end up in very 
different places, such as X and Y in Figure 2, at a given point in time. For as long as 
the exogenous driving force operates on this non-equilibrium system, it will continue 
to pass through time via a succession of bifurcations. The growth path, therefore, is 
the unpredictable outcome of forced crises, the local interaction of many system 
members, and historical contingency or chance. Also, owing to positive feedback, the 
path taken is highly sensitive to the system’s initial conditions. 
 
The question of interest here is: How relevant is this model to the growth and 
fluctuations of human society? The short answer is: Not at all relevant, as human 
society does not change in this way at all. Hence, those economists interested in 
dynamics need to abandon statistical physics and adopt the method of ‘dynamic 
stratology’ outlined here. The critical point is that societal growth is not an outcome 
of exogenously forced crises, local interaction, arbitrary ‘choices’, or a pattern of 
bifurcated pathways. Rather, as I have shown in many publications (Snooks 1996; 
1997; 1998a; 1998b; 1999; 2000; 2003; 2005a), it is the outcome of an endogenous 
driving force (called ‘strategic desire’) attempting to maximise the probability of 
survival and prosperity, the rational adoption by strategists of a sequence of dynamic 
strategies that fulfils this objective, and the forging of a dynamic pathway that reflects 
the wave-like pattern of the exploitation and exhaustion of this strategic sequence. 
The dynamic pathway of human society, therefore, is not a forced and unpredictable 
zig-zag pattern through an arbitrary world, but a predictable progression of wave-like 
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surges that finally exhausts the system’s strategic opportunities and collapses 
irretrievably. Such a collapse cannot just happen at any time or be caused by a small 
trigger; rather it is the culmination of a robust process of strategic exploitation and 
exhaustion.  
 What is true for human society is, as shown in The Collapse of Darwinism 
(Snooks 2003: ch. 9), also true of other species. Hence, the science historian John 
Gribbin (2005:157) is wrong when he claims: 
What the fossil record seems to be telling us is that extinctions happen on all 
scales, all the time, and that (like earthquakes) an extinction of any size can 
happen at any time…. An extinction of any size might be set off by a trigger 
of any size. 
This is a misreading of the fossil evidence arising from a commitment to the so-called 
‘universality’ of complexity theory. In reality, the scale of extinctions at any point in 
time is a function of the various levels at which the strategic pursuit occurs – at the 
population, species, closely-related-groups of species, and dynasty levels (Snooks 
2003; 2005a). While extinctions at any of these levels may be happening at any time, 
they are the complex outcomes of the exploitation and exhaustion of dynamic-strategy 
sequences at these levels – the outcome of strategic laws – not the outcome of power 
laws at the global level for life as a whole. Collapse and extinction emerge from 
cumulative strategic processes in which the key relationship is that of ‘strategic 
exchange’ between purposeful agents and a changing strategic demand as the strategic 
sequence unfolds (in a materialist and not teleological way). All other relationships 
and ‘interactions’ are shaped by this creative exchange (Snooks 1997; 2003). 
 
 
THE RELEVANCE OF A THEORY IN WHICH ‘PARTICLES BECOME 
PEOPLE’ 
 
Complexity theory has a number of useful applications in the physical world. Self-
organised criticality has been employed by some to explain the size-distribution of 
earthquakes, volcanic activity, forest fires, solar flares, and ‘starquakes’ (Bak 1997). 
This may well be reasonable in the case of these inanimate systems. Yet, increasingly, 
there have been attempts to apply this form of statistical physics to living systems; to 
the origin of life (Kauffman 1993; 1995), the extinction of species (Bak 1997), and, 
initially, to various extreme situations in human society (Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and 
Bennett 1993). More recently, there has been a push, called agent-based modelling 
(ABM), to formalise this concept in the social sciences in general and economics in 
particular (Epstein and Axtell 1996, Epstein 1999, Tesfatsion and Judd 2006). To 
justify this inflation of complexity theory, the science writer Philip Ball (2004: 135, 
my emphasis) says: ‘To develop a physics of society, we must take a bold step that 
some might regard as a leap of faith and others as a preposterous idealization … [in 
which] particles will become people’. It certainly is both bold and preposterous, but 
more significantly it is totally unable to encapsulate the dynamics of life. 
 The central deficiency of complexity theory is that it does not constitute an 
endogenous general dynamic theory of life and human society. It does not, in other 
words, embrace a self-starting, self-sustaining system driven by self-motivated agents 
capable of participating in a creative exchange with their society’s constantly 
changing parameters. It postulates either a system of interacting particles driven by an 
exogenous force or, more recently, a system of ‘heterogenous autonomous actors with 
bounded information and computing capacity’ (Epstein 1999: 56). In both cases the 
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structure of the theory is essentially the same. Hence, complexity theory is unable to 
explain or predict the group dynamics of living systems. Without these abilities, a 
physics of society is impossible. The best case that can be made for the theory of self-
organisation is that its conclusions are not entirely inconsistent with the outcomes – 
rather than the processes – of living agents caught up in extreme or arbitrary 
situations over which they have no control. These situations include traffic jams, 
flight from burning buildings, and the like. Also the focus in these attempts to model 
living systems is usually on the way life forms travel over physical terrain. A brief 
review of some of the claims of social physicists will demonstrate this point. 
 Many of the studies in question focus on the physical pathways of life forms 
(bacteria), including our own (cities). Why? Because physical laws are clearly 
involved in the way life forms traverse the physical terrain of this planet. The flaw in 
this approach, however, is that our movement over the Earth’s surface is the outcome 
of a more profound dynamic process, driven by laws of its own. This geographical 
expansion of human society can take the form of urban development that is the 
outcome of either the commerce strategy of the pre-modern era, or the technological 
strategy of our own era; or of the occupation of new productive lands, trading bases, 
or fortified towns as the outcome of the family-multiplication, commerce, or conquest 
strategies respectively. While physical constraints must be overcome in any type of 
geographical expansion, the underlying dynamic processes are strategic not physical. 
 Complexity theory, therefore, is completely unable to explain the fundamental 
dynamic processes of life. Accordingly it has focussed instead on the trivial outcomes 
of those processes, such as the fractal patterns of growing bacteria, the way crowds of 
people react to crisis in constrained conditions, and the reaction of car drivers in 
traffic jams. Even if it could be demonstrated that the laws of physics can explain 
these dynamically marginal and non-strategic happenings, this would still be a very 
long way from building the fanciful citadel of ‘social physics’. The problem for 
would-be social physicists is that even in highly physically constrained situations, 
self-motivated ‘people’ can and do respond in ways that ‘particles’ cannot and will 
never do. This is why the statistical results of human interactions never conform 
entirely to what is expected of particles obeying power laws. Instead, the so-called 
mechanical interactions on the part of individuals caught in extreme situations are a 
form of ‘strategic interaction’ – of following those individuals who, or rules that, give 
promise of success (called ‘strategic imitation’) – which is shaped by the more 
fundamental ‘strategic exchange’. 
 Some complexity theorists, however, are not satisfied with examining the 
physics of crowd behaviour. They appear to believe that an all-embracing physics of 
society really is possible. Accordingly they are determined to apply their theory to 
less trivial – in a dynamic sense – aspects of human society. These issues include the 
history of civilization, ‘economic’ fluctuations, income distribution, the size and 
growth of firms, the role of government, cooperation, the world-wide-web, voting, 
crime and punishment, and marriage. Of these I will consider only the more 
ambitious. 
 
A physics of history? 
 
A number of attempts have been made to develop a physics of history. In Ubiquity, 
for example, the physicist and science writer Mark Buchanan (2000) claims that 
history operates in a self-organised critical way, via a recurrent process of growing 
complexity and collapse owing to interaction between agents. Essentially this process 
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is the outcome of conflicts and wars, which in turn are the result of international 
tensions that keep the major nations in a state of constant diplomatic crisis (that is, a 
SOC). In such circumstances, conflicts and wars are inevitable, and they are governed 
by a power law. That is to say, conflicts of any size can be sparked at any time by the 
smallest disturbance – such as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 
Sarajevo in 1914. 
In terms of the dynamic-strategy theory – the basic theory underlying the 
concept of selfcreation – this argument makes little sense. In reality, wars are either 
part of the conquest strategy or they are the outcome of attempts to defend or gain 
control of a nation’s dynamic strategy. In both cases, wars have deeply felt strategic 
causes and are not the outcome of trivial or accidental events. But, of course, trivial 
events may be employed as an excuse to begin a major conflict, such as the First 
World War, that has deeper strategic causes (Snooks 1997: 503-08). What a more 
profound analysis makes clear is that as major wars are extremely expensive in terms 
of financial resources, infrastructure, and human lives, they are only undertaken by 
strategically rational nations if the likely outcome is expected to be highly profitable. 
Certainly, they are not likely to occur at ‘any time’ as a result of trivial causes that 
could be resolved more economically – such as by diplomacy, counter assassination, 
or limited military strikes. Like all other dynamic strategies, wars obey strategic laws 
not power laws (particularly when only a handful of nations, rather than the required 
large numbers, are involved). 
Despite the limitations of these physical models, even some political scientists 
have been tempted to explain major historical episodes in their terms. Robert Axelrod 
(1993) and his colleagues have employed the theory of statistical mechanics to 
develop what they call ‘landscape theory’ to explain the formation of alliances 
between nations. The landscape model centres on the idea that there exist forces of 
‘attraction’ and ‘repulsion’ between interacting nations, and its objective is to 
discover the most stable way that resulting national alliances can be arranged. To 
discover this equilibrium state, Axelrod et al focus on the ‘energy’ generated by these 
forces of attraction and repulsion. Close rivals generate high energy levels if forced 
into the same camp, but lower energy if grouped with nations that are complementary 
rather than competitive. Hence, the lowest-energy configuration is supposed to 
provide the most stable pattern of alliances. A three-dimensional energy landscape 
can be computer generated to show an energy terrain consisting of peaks and valleys, 
in order to see how best to maximise alliance stability. 
While the landscape model makes reasonably accurate retrospective 
‘predictions’ about the alliances during the Second World War, similar results could 
have been obtained merely by possessing a moderately good understanding of the 
political ambitions and economic strategies of the nations of Europe during the 
interwar period. The energy landscape diagram is merely technical window dressing. 
And of course it tells us nothing about why the Second World War broke out. That 
requires a more sophisticated understanding of historical and, particularly, ‘strategic’ 
processes.  
More importantly, what this exercise highlights is the poverty of the supply-
side approach that plagues not only social physics but all orthodox academic 
disciplines. When a theory has no demand-side, how is it possible to determine where 
a system is headed – its ‘directionality’? While the life sciences elect to explain 
outcomes as being extruded from fixed supply-side characteristics, such as the genetic 
structure or the psychology of agents, the physical sciences employ the idea of 
‘attractors’. Attractors, or equilibrium states, are usually discussed in physical terms. 
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They are the ‘valleys’ and ‘depressions’ in energy landscapes towards which complex 
systems are attracted, just as water or other physical objects traverse physical terrain. 
The attempt to apply this type of physical thinking to living systems, particularly 
human society, is doomed to failure.  
An entirely new type of social theory is required to explain the direction taken 
by history. We need to abandon simplistic supply-side theory – the sound of one hand 
clapping – and adopt a more sophisticated and comprehensive type of theory that 
includes a demand side. Over the past decade I have developed such a theory, in 
which ‘directionality’ in human society and history is determined by the generation of 
‘strategic demand’. In the above example of alliance formation, political patterns and 
any resulting conflicts can be seen as the outcome of national strategic pursuits, which 
in turn are shaped by changing strategic demand (Snooks 1996; 1997).  When dealing 
with the dynamics of human society, we must look to strategic laws not the laws of 
physics (Snooks 1998a). 
 
A physics of the economy – or of the ‘casino’?  
 
Currently there are two broad approaches taken by physicists to the modern economy. 
The first of these is known as ‘observational econophysics’, and one of its pioneers is 
Bertrand Roehner (2002), a physicist at the University of Paris. This is an important 
approach to reality, concerned to discover the real-world patterns in a wide cross-
section of comparative data on economic events in order to inductively develop 
theoretical explanations. We can expect major advances in our understanding of 
human society from this systematic empirical methodology. The second approach 
involves an attempt to apply existing theories from statistical physics to the human 
economy. This is a deeply flawed approach that requires further discussion. 
 There is a fundamental confusion in the minds of many physicists about the 
identity and nature of the modern economy. They are determined to treat the stock 
exchange as if it were the core of the market economy. In this way, statistical 
physicists feel comfortable in turning their backs on real economic data (such as GDP, 
output, labour, capital, and the prices of real commodities and services), and in 
focusing their attention on the prices of stocks and shares. They are in effect turning 
away from the economy to the ‘casino’. They do so because not only do they fail to 
understand what the economy really is, but because they think they see the laws of 
physics reflected in the behaviour of the stock exchange if not in the real economy. 
 Philip Ball (2004: 240), for example, focuses on Standard and Poor’s 500 
stock-market index, which, we are told, is ‘a common measure of the state of the US 
economy’. By doing so he concludes that ‘market prices’ are not randomly generated. 
Instead of being confined to a limited range, this price data is subject to some large 
fluctuations – a random walk with some ‘big leaps’. He also claims that ‘the economy 
[he means the stock exchange] does not appear to be guided very much by 
rationality’, rather it is ‘chaotic and irrational’, ‘intrinsically unstable’, and, hence, not 
amenable to the correcting influence of public policy. Instead, the ‘economy’ is said 
to obey a power law, by which economic crises both large and small can arise at any 
time in this state of self-organised criticality as the outcome of even small triggers. In 
this light, the Great Depression of the 1930s is seen as an outcome of the Wall Street 
crash, triggered by some small, overlooked, disturbance. 
 But there is a caveat, as even stock-exchange prices do not behave as a 
statistical physicist would wish. Hence, we are told that: 
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The idea of a self-organised critical economy is an appealing one [only to a 
physicist!]. But sadly, like the sand-pile model, it seems to be right in spirit 
but wrong in detail. The very essence of SOC is scale-free behaviour 
described by a power law. But although economic data, such as the rise and 
fall of the S&P 500 index, can appear to behave in this way within certain 
limits, these feature do not persist in the big picture …. The larger the time 
step, the more the probability distribution of fluctuations approaches the 
gaussian form …. So any model which assumes or predicts a single 
mathematical form for statistics of price changes on all timescales cannot be 
right …. So … SOC alone is not the key to how the economy works’. (Ball 
2004: 301-02; my emphasis) 
 
So, complexity theory applied to the ‘economy’ is right in spirit but wrong in 
some of its details, mainly in the longer term. Right? Wrong! Complexity theory is 
wrong in spirit as well as in all the details. In the first place, the stock exchange is not 
the real economy. While it plays an important role in raising capital for business 
ventures, it is largely a house of speculation – what I prefer to call the ‘casino’. 
Instead of looking to the real economy for answers, physicists focus instead on the 
‘casino’. Data from the real economy – such as GDP, labour, capital, and the prices of 
real goods and services – reflect the incentives and outcomes of the strategic pursuit, 
whereas data from the ‘casino’ – such as the prices of stocks and shares – largely 
reflect the gambling spirit of society. As John Maynard Keynes once shrewdly said 
(in effect): all is well while speculation is the bubble on the ocean, but when it 
becomes the ocean, society is in deep trouble. 
Despite facilitating the raising of capital, the stock exchange is highly 
dependent upon the real economy, and it can be understood in the longer term only by 
what is happening there – in particular what stage has been reached in the unfolding 
of the dominant dynamic strategy. For example, in the era of the Great Depression, 
investors accustomed to high profits shifted their attention from the real economy to 
the ‘casino’ as the US dynamic strategy exhausted itself by the mid 1920s. It was this 
that led to grossly excessive speculation on, and the collapse of, Wall Street – not the 
other way around (Snooks 1997: 384–90). In the shorter term, stock-market prices are 
driven merely by the dreams and nightmares of speculators and gamblers. 
Why are physicists attracted to the ‘casino’ rather than the real economy? 
Because, in the short term, at least, the stock exchange vaguely resembles their 
physical models of interaction, with buyers and sellers responding not to strategic 
demand but to the flashing lights (like the tail lights of cars caught in a growing traffic 
jam) on a great electronic board, or on millions of small electronic boards carrying the 
same seductive data. The desperate knee-jerk reaction of speculators makes the stock 
exchange operate like the physicists’ interaction model in the short run. But in the 
long run the stock exchange is dominated by the real economy, attracting or 
disgorging investors who are habituated to reaping high material returns. In the long 
run even the stock exchange must be explained using strategic laws rather than power 
laws. Hence, there will never be a physics of society, and physicists will never frame 
economic policy. 
In the second place, real economies do not obey power laws, because human 
agents manage the prevailing feedback mechanisms, thereby restraining growth, and 
preventing small triggers from exercising chaotic effects. The strategic organism is 
much under-rated by social physicists. Societies eventually collapse not because of 
run-away growth on the cusp of chaos but because the strategic sequence they are 
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pursuing is finally exhausted and cannot be replaced. And this exhaustion is the 
outcome of a long-run, cumulative process of development – a process that obeys 
strategic laws not power laws. 
 
A physics of economic dynamics?  
 
Some economists unhappy with the comparative-static approach of their discipline are 
attempting to employ the physics approach to systems to develop a theory of 
economic dynamics. The pioneers of this movement appear to have been influenced 
by statistical physics initially in the form of game theory and later through complexity 
theory (Axelrod 1984, Axelrod 1987, Epstein 1999). This agent-based computational 
economics (ACE) group is concerned with the complex outcomes that arise from the 
interaction between agents that possess computing abilities and operate with bounded 
information. As such they are concerned with the interactions between ‘people’ rather 
than ‘particles’. Yet they accept and adopt the causal mechanism of the physics’ 
model – the local interaction between agents – to explain the ‘emergence’ of 
complexity.  Their model, therefore, is a physics-influenced, supply-side approach to 
complex systems. It is, in their words, a theory about ‘artificial societies’. They see 
the ‘emergence’ of order and complexity as being in the tradition of Adam Smith’s 
‘invisible hand’ and Friedrich von Hayek’s ‘spontaneous order’. But neither they nor 
their heroes are/were aware of the universal dynamic force that shapes interactions 
between agents. As I have suggested earlier, that unseen but universally powerful 
force is ‘strategic demand’, which is responsible for managing the key process of 
‘strategic exchange’.  
The influence of this supply-side physics can be seen reflected in the central 
question posed by ACE advocates: ‘How could the decentralized local interactions of 
heterogeneous autonomous agents generate the given [macroscopic] regularity?’ 
(Epstein 1999: 41).  In order to answer this highly physics-biased question, ACE- 
advocates develop simple sets of rules of local interaction that will mimic the real-
world patterns in which they are interested. This is done by employing computerised 
simulation techniques. In other words, they attempt to develop computerised ‘artificial 
societies’ – for example, the sweetly seductive but achingly hollow computer game 
called ‘Sugarscape’ (Epstein and Axtell 1996) – that are based on the insights of 
complexity in physical systems to explain real-world patterns in human society. 
This is a very risky approach. If the supply-side physics model is not 
applicable to living systems, then the entire ACE programme is fatally flawed. It will 
create a model not of the universe we actually inhabit but of some parallel universe in 
which the physics model is valid for living systems. In other words, this programme 
will entirely distort our understanding of reality. The question that should have been 
asked is: What is the real-world mechanism that is actually responsible for the macro-
societal patterns we observe, and how can it be encompassed in a general dynamic 
theory of life and human society? Such a question is far more difficult to answer, but 
at least it does not commit us to a prejudicial and deforming answer.  
Does the theory of self-organisation survive the translation from physics to the 
life sciences? When analysing physical systems, it may be reasonable to suppose that 
local interactions are the outcome of the laws of physics and that these interactions are 
responsible for the emergence of complexity. But how can we relate this to living 
systems, and how are we to interpret the implications for reality? Essentially the rules 
of interaction in ‘artificial’ living systems are those devised and manipulated by a 
human simulator in order to mimic patterns observed in reality. Yet what does this 
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imply about the emergence of complexity in reality? It implies that the whole process 
is generated by an artificial outsider – a  ‘Divine Simulator’! Once you abandon the 
laws of physics, ‘God’ is required to make any ‘self’-organisational system work. 
This involves a massive contradiction – an omniscient outsider to create the rules for 
‘self’-organisation – from which there is no escape for ACE advocates.       
But there is a way out for those willing to abandon the supply-side physics 
model entirely. As suggested above, the theory of self-organisation theory is wrongly 
focused. We need to look at the creative exchanges between agents on the one hand 
and the ever-changing parameters of their society on the other, not just at the 
interaction between agents. While agents do compete with each other over resources 
and material outcomes, this is secondary to the ‘strategic exchange’ between these 
agents and the unfolding dynamic strategy of their society. The vast majority of 
individuals actually struggle to conform to the pattern of strategic behaviour exhibited 
by successful strategic pioneers. This is what I call ‘strategic imitation’ – one of the 
most powerful forces in human society. Hence, the ‘strategic pursuit’ is a joint and 
cooperative activity. Individuals are not bouncing off each other in arbitrary and 
irrational ways, but are rationally attempting to join together in creative ways to 
maximise their joint material outcomes. While they compete with each other, it is 
merely to achieve marginally better positions within this process. It is essential to 
realise that the joint strategic pursuit is of far greater importance than any individual 
competitive interaction. Further discussion of the idea of cooperation will clearly 
demonstrate this conclusion. 
 
Cooperation or chaos? 
 
Cooperation is a vital but problematical concept in social physics. Cooperation is vital 
because the idea of order on the edge of chaos – self-organised criticality – is a 
frightening one for physicists who have little understanding of the self-sustaining 
nature of human society. Cooperation is seen as a way of avoiding the descent into 
chaos. One commentator writes: ‘If we know that cooperation is possible, even in a 
world that lacks altruism, we have no reason to despair’ (Ball 2004: 563). And 
cooperation is problematical for social physicists because complexity theory cannot 
explain it persuasively. Self-organisation theory is all about physical interaction – or 
primitive competition – not about working together on a joint life pursuit. Indeed, no 
supply-side theory – whether it be neo-Darwinism or game theory – can deal 
successfully with cooperation as it appears in the real world (Snooks 2003). 
 It is for the above reasons that some physical and social scientists, convinced 
of the importance of self-organisation theory, are concerned about the implications of 
the Snooks-Panov algorithm. This algorithm is a mathematical formulation showing 
that the process of biological/technological transformation over the past 4,000 myrs 
has occurred exponentially (Snooks 1996: 79-82, 92-5, 402-05; Snooks 2005a: 229-
31; Panov 2005). These scholars are concerned that the checks and balances required 
to prevent the order of human society from descending into chaos are not sufficiently 
robust (Nazaretyan 2005a-c; Panov 2005). Their concern, however, is merely the 
result of the limitations of a supply-side complexity theory. As my demand-side 
dynamic-strategy theory shows, robust checks and balances do in fact exist, with the 
result that the exponential growth of life and human society has occurred over the past 
4,000 myrs, and will continue to occur, at a constant, not an increasing, compound 
rate of growth (Snooks 2005b; 2005c). Human society is not about to launch itself 
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into the chasm of chaos, because strategic agents are past masters at managing 
feedback. 
 How do social physicists attempt to resolve this dilemma – of cooperation or 
chaos – which is of their own making. The role of governments in compelling 
cooperation and punishing transgressors is usually considered but finally rejected by 
all except those with authoritarian tendencies. So, in hope rather than conviction, it is 
suggested that game theory – another supply-side approach – might provide the 
answer all concerned social physicists are looking for. This would be a happy 
outcome indeed, because game theory was the joint product of the statistical physicist 
John Von Neumann (1903–57) and the economist Oskar Morgenstern, which resulted 
in the celebrated Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. 
 The often-expressed hope of social physicists is that ‘cooperation can evolve’. 
It is believed that through repeated interactions, players in the game of life will learn 
from past errors and develop ‘mutual trust’. One problem with this line of argument is 
that the results of organised games are not encouraging. In the late 1970s, Robert 
Axelrod (1984) organised a series of internet tournaments to discover how interactive 
games could be most effectively played. He found that there is no ‘best’ way to play 
these games, as it all depends on who the participants are and what tactics (‘strategies’ 
in this context is a misnomer) they are convinced in advance will win – which merely 
demonstrates that the physical interaction model makes little sense. What did emerge 
clearly from these games is that even when convinced cooperators made initial gains, 
they were always ultimately vulnerable to rogue defectors. Even a small band of 
defectors could totally destroy a cooperative culture. Some have concluded that only a 
strong and harsh central government could prevent this, which is hardly a solution for 
liberal democracies. And, of course, this brings us back to the very reason that game 
theory was resorted to by social physicists in the first place! 
 It is also clear from any realist stance that game theory is not well founded. 
First, games like ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ and ‘tit-for-tat’ (in its various forms) are highly 
artificial and unrealistic. They are merely the result of arbitrary rules that can be 
changed to obtain the outcomes one desires. In reality, the rules of engagement are set 
by strategic demand in any life system. Second, the implications of this approach for 
our understanding of reality are metaphysical. It suggests that life resembles a supply-
side computer world in which the rules of interaction are determined and arbitrarily 
changed by an all-powerful being from outside the system. Game theory, as in ACE 
‘artificial’ societies, requires ‘God’ to make it work – to generate order and prevent 
chaos. The only solution to this problem is a robust general dynamic theory that is 
capable of generating all the necessary rules of engagement endogenously.  
 This brings us to the third and most fundamental problem. Social physicists 
have failed to recognise the existence, let alone the role, of  ‘strategic exchange’, 
which is the central feature of a demand-dominated general dynamic theory. Social 
physics is, as I have mentioned before, like one hand clapping, as it focuses solely on 
the supply-side interaction between agents. In doing so, it fails to appreciate the 
existence of a dominant demand side that shapes the social order as well as the rules 
of engagement. It is, as we have seen, the demand side that provides the 
‘directionality’ lacking in self-organisation theory. Strategic demand, which changes 
as the dominant dynamic strategy unfolds, calls forth a joint response from all active 
agents in any society. This is the process of strategic exchange. And in this process, 
trust is invested by individuals in the successful strategic pursuit – reflected in an 
increasing material prosperity – and not in each other. Cooperation is the outcome. 
When the success of the strategic pursuit wanes, both trust and cooperation decline 
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and, under conditions of extreme crisis, evaporate completely. Competition, or 
interaction, between agents is a phenomenon that is secondary to ‘strategic 
cooperation’. 
 Order, therefore, is the outcome of a successfully unfolding dominant dynamic 
strategy. The anxiety expressed by social physicists about sustaining order on the 
edge of chaos is the outcome of a fundamentally flawed theory – a science fiction. 
There can be no social physics, only ‘social stratology’ – a new study of the dynamics 
of the strategic pursuit. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite all the obvious difficulties in applying statistical physics even to the margins 
of human society, there are those who believe it has a role to play in the social 
sciences. Numbered among them are even some social scientists. We have seen how 
advocates of ACE have distorted our view of dynamic processes by adopting the 
structural characteristics, if not the laws, of the physics model. Even a few historical 
economists, such as Paul David (1993), have been misled by physical models in their 
adoption of the hypothesis of ‘path dependence’ (Arthur 1989). This is the idea that 
institutional features of the past exercise a strong and relatively inflexible influence 
over the present. And, more recently, some scholars interested in ‘big history’ (or 
universal history) have embraced the theory of self-organisation, largely because it 
tells a simple, apparently universal, story about the complexity of the real world. In 
both cases this simple story of complexity is also a misleading story. The social and 
behavioural sciences will only tell a convincing story about social complexity when 
they turn from simplistic physical theories to embrace more complex realist societal 
theories. 
 But to some, statistical physics continues to offer a degree of hope and 
universality in an apparently chaotic and fragmented world. We are, for example, 
encouraged to respond  
With a certain wonder at the universality that organizes many aspects of 
society in the same way as it directs the properties of atoms. We need not turn 
this into a ‘religion of science’…We can simply celebrate the fact that there 
are indeed ‘laws of large numbers’ and that they let us divine order and 
regularity in an otherwise terrifying diversity. (Ball 2004: 310) 
Of course, a ‘terrifying diversity’ is the fate facing those who possess no realist 
general dynamic theory to explain the world in which we live – a terrifying diversity 
that causes many to clutch at the straws of  an entirely deficient complexity theory.  
 As we have seen, neither physics nor ABM has much to tell us about the 
choices made by living agents. And choice is central to the process of ‘strategic 
exchange’ that drives all living systems. Complexity in human culture is not simply 
extruded from the supply side of human society through ‘local interaction’ but rather 
is the outcome of a creative response to the strategic demand generated by an 
unfolding dynamic strategy. Similarly, complexity is not the isolated outcome of 
individual psychology as many behaviouralists would claim. That too is an unhelpful 
supply-side approach, as shown in The Selfcreating Mind (2006). To understand the 
real ‘global state’ of human society, we need to adopt a realist general dynamic theory 
from within the social sciences, not a statistical theory from the physical sciences. 
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 Fig. 2.  Non-equilibrium growth pathways 
